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From the beginning of discussions of a possible monetary union in Europe 
in the late 1950s, it was understood that differing business cycle patterns among 
the member countries were likely to be a major problem. Robert Mundell noted 
this argument against a large monetary union in his seminal American Economic 
Review article in 1960, and it became clear that a 'one size fits all' monetary 
policy would not fit all if members experienced quite different macroeconomic 
circumstances. 1. Countries in recession would prefer an expansionary monetary 
policy while those with stronger aggregate demand circumstances would want 
higher interest rates and more restraint. Serious disagreements among the 
member countries could be foreseen. 
This problem is not unknown among the 12 Federal Reserve districts. The 
Minneapolis, Kansas City, and Dallas districts, all of which are heavily dependent 
on oil and gas, agriculture, mining, and the production of other raw materials 
often move together but quite differently from the other nine districts so regional 
differences of opinion within the FOMC are distinctly possible. 
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This problem can be expected, however, to be far more serious in Europe 
because it consists of quite different national economies which would be 
expected to diverge more than would regions of the United States. If EMU had a 
smaller membership of quite similar economies, such as the original six 
members of the Common Market, this would not be such an issue, but with 
twelve (thirteen as of January 1, 2007 with the entry of Slovenia) quite diverse 
members, some of which are at considerable distance from each other (Finland 
and Greece), this is an obvious problem. As more members are added, such as 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, etc., it can be expected to become worse. 
In recent years there have been well reported examples of such 
divergences. Germany, France, and Italy have had soft economies, although 
Germany is now recovering strongly, while Ireland, Finland, Spain, and Greece 
have had inflationary demand pressures. The French and their neighbors have 
preferred an expansionary policy, and have often complained about the 
European Central Bank's restraint. Ireland and other smaller members have had 
sufficient votes on the Governing Council of the ECB to see to it that relatively 
firm policies prevailed. The fact that each EMU member has the same vote on 
the Governing Council has meant that large population countries, such as 
Germany, France, and Italy are badly under-represented, and that small groups 
of people in Ireland, Finland, etc. can prevail over the majority of the EMU 
population. 
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When EMU has more than fifteen members, this will change because 
there will be weighted voting, but the small population countries will still be badly 
over-represented. At least in the United States the plan was to allow the 
economically large districts {New York, Cleveland, and Chicago) to have more 
power on the FOMC, but shifting populations have meant that the 12th District 
{San Francisco, which contains the western third of the country, including Hawaii 
and Alaska) should have much more influence, and Cleveland/Chicago less. 
There is at present, however, no pressure to change the FOMC voting pattern 
despite its apparent unfairness to the far west. 
Returning to Europe, supporters of EMU have argued that although the 
member countries may start out with differing macroeconomic cycles, and 
therefore with different monetary preferences, the very existence of the monetary 
bloc will lead to convergence. In a few years, it has been argued, what had been 
quite large differences in national business cycles will fade into a homogeneous 
European macroeconomy. 2. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether convergence is 
actually occurring within Europe, which groups of countries are converging, and 
the macroeconomic indicators for which such convergence is apparent. Free 
trade and a single currency should lead to convergence in rates of inflation, but 
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perhaps not in unemployment rates or in GDP growth. These latter aspects of 
economic performance are politically important, because the voters become 
decidedly displeased if unemployment is high and growth slow, as has been the 
case in France, Germany, and Italy during recent years. 
The Groups of Countries And The Data 
Three groups of countries are tested for evidence of convergence. The 
first is the original six members of the European Common Market Germany, 
France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Since these countries 
have maintained free trade for many decades, have all been in EMU from its 
inceptions, are contiguous, and have similar levels of development and 
economic structures, it might be expected that convergence would be stronger in 
this group. The second category is the twelve recent members of EMU: the 
previous six plus Finland, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Austria. Finally 
current and prospective members are studied: the twelve of the previous group 
plus Slovenia (which joined January 1, 2007), the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. Hungary is not included because its 
macroeconomic performance has been quite different (worse) than that required 
for membership, so it cannot be expected to join EMU in the near future. 
Three aspects of economic performance are considered for the 
1990-2005 period: annual inflation in the consumer price index, the average 
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annual unemployment rate, and annual growth of real GDP. These would appear 
to be the macroeconomic variables about which voters care the most in that poor 
national performance in one or more of them is likely to bring on the wrath of 
voters. 
Standard deviations, which are the standard statistical method of 
measuring convergence or divergence in a data set, are calculated annually for 
each variable from 1990 through 2005 for each group of countries. Regressions 
are run for the standard deviations on time. If the annual standard deviations for 
a variable decline over the 1990-2005 period, and if the regressions indicate that 
the decline is statistically significant, convergence would be strongly supported, 
and vice versa. 
The Original Six 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 present the standard deviations for the growth of real 
GDP, inflation, and unemployment from 1990 through 2005. 
Insert Figures 1, 2, and 3 
As can easily be seen there have been declines in the standard deviations for all 
three variables over the 1990-2005 period, but decline for real GDP growth is 
quite modest. The T ratio for the regression of time on inflation standard 
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deviations is -4.89, which is strongly significant. For unemployment rates, the T 
ratio is -2.87, which is also clearly meaningful. Only GDP growth rates fail to 
support convergence. The T ratio is -.46, which is the correct sign, but far too 
small to indicate convergence. For two of the three variables, convergence is 
clear and in the third no clear conclusion is possible, but the sign is correct. The 
three T ratios average -2.74. Overall macroeconomic convergence since the 
beginning of EMU is supported for the six original members of the European 
Common Market, all of whom were members of EMU from its inception. 
The Recent Twelve 
Macroeconomic convergence is even more strongly indicated for the 
recent membership, as the three following graphs make clear. 
Insert Figures 4, 5, and 6 
All three of the T ratios are of the correct sign and are clearly significant. The T 
ratio for GDP growth is -3.08, and for inflation rates it is even higher at -7.59. lt is 
-8.29 for unemployment, producing an average of -6.32 for the three variables. 
This leads to the clear conclusion that convergence has occurred for these 
twelve countries since 1990. These countries really have become more similar in 
their macroeconomic performance in the fifteen years since EMU began. This 
should suggest fewer strong disagreements among the members on the subject 
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of what monetary policy should be pursued despite press reports of German 
unhappiness with European Central Bank policies. 
The Recent Twelve Plus.Seven Prospective Members 
The addition of the seven prospective members leaves the conclusion in 
place that convergence has occurred, but it is, unsurprisingly, not as strong a 
trend as was the case for the twelve recent members. 
Insert Figures 7, 8, and 9 
All three of the T ratios are of the correct sign and are statistically significant, but 
two of the three are a bit marginal. The T ratio for real GDP growth is -2.7 4, and 
for inflation it is -2.72. Both are significant, but only slightly. The evidence for 
convergence in these two variables is weak. Unemployment rates, however, are 
quite different. The T ratio is -6.28, which means that the 19 labor markets 
have become much more similar in their cyclical behavior since 1990. This may 
be because at present people from Eastern Europe can relatively easily go to the 
west to find employment, a particularly large number of Poles having done so. 
Since a number of the eastern European countries went through some 
macroeconomics turmoil at the beginning of the 1990's, a few outliers were 
dropped from the data to avoid forcing the conclusion that convergence had 
occurred. The average for the three T ratios was -3.91 which clearly supports 
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overall macroeconomic convergence across Europe during this fifteen year 
period. 
In addition to time trends in the three groups of countries, it may be 
worthwhile to briefly consider the absolute levels of the standard deviations in the 
groups. As can be seen on the left hand axis of Figures 1 through 3, the 
macroeconomies of the original six members of the European Common Market 
were already very similar before the 1990 beginning of EMU. The three 
standard deviations averaged only about 2.5 early in the 1990s and fell to about 
1.8 by the early 2000's. There could not be much convergence for these 
economies over the fifteen year period of the study because they were already 
very similar. In addition it is far more difficult to show a significant trend in 
standard deviations through time with only six data points for each annual 
observation than it is with twelve or nineteen data points for each year. 
As can be seen in Figures 4 through 6, the three standard deviations 
for the twelve recent members began the 1990s at higher levels, averaging 
about 5.5 before falling to just over 2 by the early 2000's. More convergence 
was possible because these countries started out being somewhat less similar 
than were the six original members. As can be seen in Figures 7 through 9, 
this conclusion holds more strikingly for the nineteen members and prospective 
members. The three standard deviations began the 1990's at an average of 
almost 20, which then declined to a bit less than 4 by the middle of this decade. 
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Far more convergence was possible for the 19 countries precisely because this 
group started the 1990s with quite different macroeconomic outcomes. 
Conclusion 
Fears of large and persistence macroeconomic differences among EMU 
members, leading to never ending turmoil on the Governing Council the 
European Central Bank appear to have been exaggerated. While there are 
differences in business cycle patterns among the EMU members and 
prospective entrants, these differences have been declining. If this trend toward 
macroeconomic convergence in the variables about which voters care the most 
(unemployment, inflation, and real GDP growth) continues, the EMU economy 
could become similar that of the United States. Regional differences will still 
occur, but they probably will not be large enough to cause disruptive 
disagreements over the direction of monetary policy. 
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Titles for graphs. 
Figure 1: The Original Six: Standard Deviations for Inflation Rates 
Figure 2: The Original Six: Standard Deviations for Unemployment Rates 
Figure 3: The Original Six: Standard Deviations for Real GDP Growth 
Figure 4: The Recent Twelve Members: Standard Deviations for Inflation Rates 
Figure 5: The Recent Twelve Members: Standard Deviations for Unemployment 
Rates 
Figure 6: The Recent Twelve Members: Standard Deviations for Real GDP 
Growth 
Figure 7: Current and Prospective Members: Standard Deviations for Inflation 
Rates 
Figure 8: Current and Prospective Members: Standard Deviations for 
Unemployment 
Figure 9: Current and Prospective Members: Standard Deviations for Real GDP 
Growth 
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Figure I: The Original Six: Standard Deviations for Inflation Rates 
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Figure 2: The Original Six: Standard Deviations for Unemployment Rates 
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Figure 9: Cun·ent and Prospective Members: Standard Deviations for Real GDP Growth 
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